Tick Rounding Cost in Market Making
Consider a binary Glosten-Milgrom model where the asset value is $V \in \{0, 1\}$ with prior $P(V=1) = p$, and a fraction $q$ of incoming orders are uninformed (noise traders). The continuous zero-profit ask and bid quotes are:
$a_c = E[V \mid \text{buy}], \quad b_c = E[V \mid \text{sell}]$
Now suppose there is a discrete price grid with tick size $\delta > 0$, so you must round your quotes to the grid: $a = \lceil a_c / \delta \rceil \cdot \delta$ (round ask up) and $b = \lfloor b_c / \delta \rfloor \cdot \delta$ (round bid down).
- Compute the continuous zero-profit quotes $a_c$ and $b_c$ in terms of $p$ and $q$.
- Compute the expected rounding loss per fill on each side -- that is, the difference between what the market maker receives/pays and the continuous fair value, on the ask side and the bid side.
- Compute the expected per-trade rounding loss averaged over both sides.
- Give explicit upper bounds on these rounding losses in terms of $\delta$ and the local fill probabilities.
Hints
- Start by deriving the continuous zero-profit quotes using Bayes' rule in the standard Glosten-Milgrom setup. The ask equals $E[V \mid \text{buy order}]$.
- Rounding the ask up by at most one tick creates a per-fill gain of $\ell_a = \lceil a_c/\delta \rceil \cdot \delta - a_c$. Think about what bounds this quantity.
- For upper bounds, note that each rounding error is less than $\delta$. To get tighter bounds involving fill probabilities, consider the first-order effect: expected cost $\approx$ (quote shift) $\times$ (fill probability).
Worked Solution
How to Think About It: In the Glosten-Milgrom model, a market maker sets quotes so that on average she breaks even against the mix of informed and uninformed flow. In continuous prices, the ask equals the expected value conditional on a buy, and the bid equals the expected value conditional on a sell. The catch is that real markets have discrete tick sizes, so you can't post the exact fair price, so you have to round. Rounding the ask up and the bid down widens the spread, which means you collect a small "rounding profit" on each fill. But this also means you fill less often (wider spread deters some flow), and the interaction between rounding and fill probability creates the rounding cost we need to analyze.
Quick Estimate: If the tick size is small relative to the spread, the rounding error on each side is at most $\delta$ (one tick). In practice it is at most $\delta/2$ on average if the continuous quote is uniformly distributed within a tick. So the per-side rounding loss is bounded by $\delta$, and the expected rounding loss is bounded by $\delta/2$ in a symmetric case.
Approach: First derive the continuous quotes from Bayes' rule, then analyze the rounding.
Formal Solution:
Part 1: Continuous zero-profit quotes.
A buy order arrives from an informed trader (probability
$a_c = P(V = 1 \mid \text{buy}) = \frac{p(1-q) + p \cdot q/2}{p(1-q) + p \cdot q/2 + (1-p) \cdot q/2}$
Simplifying the numerator: $p(1 - q/2)$. The denominator: $p(1 - q/2) + (1-p) \cdot q/2 = p - pq/2 + q/2 - pq/2 = p + q/2 - pq$.
$a_c = \frac{p(1 - q/2)}{p + q/2 - pq} = \frac{p(2 - q)}{2p + q - 2pq} = \frac{p(2-q)}{2p + q(1-2p)}$
Similarly, a sell arrives from an informed trader when $V = 0$, or from noise:
$b_c = P(V = 1 \mid \text{sell}) = \frac{p \cdot q/2}{(1-p)(1-q) + (1-p) \cdot q/2 + p \cdot q/2}$
Numerator: $pq/2$. Denominator: the total sell probability is $(1-p)(1-q) + q/2$, since sells come from informed traders when $V=0$ (probability $(1-p)(1-q)$) or from noise traders (probability $q/2$). Of these, $V=1$ sells come only from noise when $V=1$, with probability $p \cdot q/2$. Thus:
$b_c = \frac{pq/2}{(1-p)(1-q) + q/2} = \frac{pq}{2(1-p)(1-q) + q} = \frac{pq}{2 - 2p - 2q + 2pq + q} = \frac{pq}{2 - 2p - q + 2pq}$
Part 2: Rounding loss per fill.
The rounded ask is $a = \lceil a_c / \delta \rceil \cdot \delta$. The rounding loss on the ask side (from the perspective of the market maker as a cost of not being at fair value) is:
$\ell_a = a - a_c$
This is the amount by which the posted ask exceeds the fair conditional value. Note $0 \leq \ell_a < \delta$. This is actually a rounding *gain* for the maker on the ask side (she sells above fair value). The rounding loss on the bid side is:
$\ell_b = b_c - b$
where $b = \lfloor b_c / \delta \rfloor \cdot \delta$, and $0 \leq \ell_b < \delta$. Again, this is a gain for the maker (she buys below fair value).
If we define rounding loss from the market's perspective (cost to liquidity takers), then per fill the ask-side loss is $\ell_a = a - a_c$ and bid-side loss is $\ell_b = b_c - b$.
Part 3: Expected per-trade rounding loss averaged over sides.
Let $\pi_a$ be the probability a trade is a buy (fill on the ask) and $\pi_b = 1 - \pi_a$ the probability it is a sell. The expected per-trade rounding loss is:
$\bar{\ell} = \pi_a \cdot \ell_a + \pi_b \cdot \ell_b$
where $\pi_a = p(1 - q/2) + (1-p) \cdot q/2$ and $\pi_b = (1-p)(1-q/2) + p \cdot q/2$ from the arrival probabilities.
If $p = 1/2$ (symmetric prior), then $\pi_a = \pi_b = 1/2$ and $\bar{\ell} = (\ell_a + \ell_b)/2$.
Part 4: Upper bounds.
Since $\ell_a = a - a_c$ where $a = \lceil a_c/\delta \rceil \cdot \delta$, we always have:
$0 \leq \ell_a < \delta, \quad 0 \leq \ell_b < \delta$
So the per-side rounding loss is strictly bounded by one tick:
$\ell_a < \delta, \quad \ell_b < \delta$
The expected per-trade rounding loss is bounded by:
$\bar{\ell} < \delta$
A tighter bound uses the fill probabilities. Let $f_a$ and $f_b$ be the fill probabilities on each side. The expected rounding cost to the market maker (the cost of not being at the exact continuous optimum, accounting for the change in fill rate) is bounded by:
$\text{Rounding cost} \leq \frac{\delta}{2}(f_a + f_b)$
This follows because rounding shifts each quote by less than $\delta$, and the first-order effect on expected profit is the shift times the fill probability.
Answer: The continuous quotes are $a_c = \frac{p(2-q)}{2p + q(1-2p)}$ and $b_c = \frac{pq}{2(1-p)(1-q) + q}$. Rounding losses per fill are $\ell_a = \lceil a_c/\delta \rceil \cdot \delta - a_c$ and $\ell_b = b_c - \lfloor b_c/\delta \rfloor \cdot \delta$, each bounded above by $\delta$. The expected per-trade loss averaged over sides is $\bar{\ell} = \pi_a \ell_a + \pi_b \ell_b < \delta$, with the tighter bound $\bar{\ell} \leq \frac{\delta}{2}(f_a + f_b)$ in terms of local fill probabilities.
Intuition
In real market making, the tick size creates a fundamental tension. You want to quote at the continuous fair value, but the grid forces you to round -- ask up, bid down. This widens the spread beyond its competitive level. On one hand, you collect extra edge per fill (the rounding profit). On the other hand, your wider quotes may deter some flow. The key insight is that the rounding cost is always bounded by one tick per side, and in practice it's much smaller because the continuous quote often falls near a grid point.
This is not just a theoretical exercise -- tick size analysis is central to exchange design, maker rebate optimization, and deciding which products to trade. When ticks are too large relative to the fair spread, market makers capture rounding rents. When ticks are too small, the continuous approximation holds and rounding is negligible. The ratio of tick size to spread is one of the most important microstructure parameters in practice.