Market Making Game: Quoting Bid-Ask Spreads
You are playing a market-making game. An asset has an unknown true value, and you must quote a bid price and an ask price each round. Other participants can hit your bid (sell to you) or lift your ask (buy from you). After several rounds, the true value is revealed and positions are settled.
Explain how you would approach quoting bid and ask prices. Specifically:
- How do you set your initial spread around your estimate of fair value?
- How should you adjust your quotes as you accumulate inventory (long or short)?
- Why does the bid-ask spread exist in the first place -- what risks does it compensate the market maker for?
Hints
- Start by computing your best estimate of fair value -- what is $E[V]$ given the information available?
- Your spread width should scale with how uncertain you are. Think about what happens if you quote too tight versus too wide.
- When you accumulate inventory, shift your entire quote (bid and ask together) to discourage further accumulation in the same direction.
Worked Solution
How to Think About It: This is the classic market-making exercise you see at every trading firm interview. The game tests whether you can think about fair value, manage risk through your quotes, and articulate the economics of why spreads exist. The key insight is that your spread is not just a profit margin -- it is your compensation for bearing uncertainty and adverse selection risk. A good market maker quotes tight when confident and wide when uncertain, and skews quotes to manage inventory.
Key Insight: Your bid-ask spread should be proportional to your uncertainty about fair value, and your quote midpoint should shift to penalize further accumulation of inventory in any direction.
The Method:
- Estimate fair value. Before quoting anything, figure out $E[V]$ based on whatever information the game gives you. If the asset pays based on a die roll, compute the expected value. If it depends on a card draw, compute the conditional expectation given what you have observed so far.
2. Set the initial spread. Quote: $\text{Bid} = E[V] - \frac{s}{2}, \quad \text{Ask} = E[V] + \frac{s}{2}$ where $s$ reflects your uncertainty. If you are very sure about fair value, quote tight (small $s$). If you have little information, quote wide. A reasonable starting rule: set $s$ roughly equal to one standard deviation of your value estimate.
3. Adjust for inventory. As you trade, you accumulate a position. If you are long (bought more than you sold), you want to encourage others to buy from you, so you lower both bid and ask. If you are short, raise both. The standard approach is to shift the midpoint: $\text{Mid}_{\text{adjusted}} = E[V] - \delta \times \text{Inventory}$ where $\delta > 0$ is a skew parameter. This means your bid and ask both drop when you are long, making it cheaper for others to buy from you and more expensive for others to sell to you.
- Update fair value. As rounds progress, use new information (trades that occur, signals revealed) to update your estimate of $E[V]$. Bayesian updating is the right framework: if someone aggressively lifts your ask, that is a signal they may know the value is higher than your estimate.
Practical Considerations:
- Adverse selection is the biggest risk. If an informed trader knows the true value is 60 and you are quoting 48-52, they will lift your ask at 52 every time. Your spread needs to be wide enough to survive these losses on average.
- Inventory risk compounds with adverse selection. Being long 100 units when the true value turns out to be lower than your estimate is painful.
- Don't be afraid to quote wide early. In the first round you have minimal information. Quoting a spread of 4-6 on a value you think is around 50 is reasonable. As you learn more, tighten.
- Profit comes from the spread. Every time you buy at your bid and sell at your ask, you earn $s$. Your job is to earn enough spread to cover the occasional adverse selection loss.
Answer: Set your spread proportional to uncertainty about fair value. Skew your midpoint away from your current inventory to manage risk. The spread compensates you for adverse selection (informed traders), inventory carrying cost, and estimation uncertainty. A good market maker constantly updates fair value, adjusts spread width based on confidence, and manages inventory through quote skewing.
Intuition
Market making is fundamentally about getting paid for bearing uncertainty. The bid-ask spread is not arbitrary profit -- it is the market maker's compensation for the risk that the next person to trade knows something you do not (adverse selection), plus the risk of holding inventory that might move against you. In real markets, this is exactly how electronic market makers operate: they estimate fair value from order flow, set spreads based on volatility and information asymmetry, and continuously skew their quotes to flatten inventory. The game version strips away the complexity of real markets but captures the core trade-off: quote too tight and you get picked off by informed traders; quote too wide and you never trade, earning nothing.
The deeper lesson is that in any two-sided market -- whether you are making markets on options, sports bets, or even negotiating a salary -- the "spread" you demand reflects your uncertainty and the chance that the other side knows more than you do. Learning to calibrate that spread is one of the most practical skills in quantitative finance.