Adverse Selection and the Break-Even Spread
A market maker faces a single trade of size 1. The next midprice change $M \in \{+1, -1\}$ (in ticks) is equally likely. With probability $\alpha$, the incoming client is informed and trades in the direction of $M$ (buys if $M = +1$, sells if $M = -1$). With probability
- \alpha$, the client is uninformed noise and buys or sells with equal probability.
You quote a bid at $m - s$ and an ask at $m + s$, where $m$ is the current midprice and $s \geq 1$ is the half-spread in ticks. After the trade, you unwind your position one step later at the new mid $m + M$.
1. Compute $E[M \mid \text{you sell at the ask}]$ and $E[M \mid \text{you buy at the bid}]$.
2. Compute the unconditional expected P&L per trade, $E[\text{P\&L}]$.
3. Find the smallest integer half-spread $s$ that makes $E[\text{P\&L}] \geq 0$, and explain the adverse-selection intuition.
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